Sexual Orientation and Choice by Ayala, Saray
Journal of Social Ontology 2017; aop
Article Open Access
Saray Ayala
Sexual Orientation and Choice
DOI 10.1515/jso-2016-0015
Abstract: Is there a choice in sexual orientation? [Wilkerson, William S. (2009): 
“Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In: Journal of Social Phi-
losophy 40. No. 1, p. 97–116] argues that sexual desires require interpretation 
in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least 
partially constituted by choice. [Díaz-León, Esa (2017): “Sexual Orientation 
as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice”; In: Journal of Social 
Ontology] critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still 
lack a good argument for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orienta-
tion. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call 
the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if interpre-
tation were not necessary to constitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element 
to constitute what we call sexual orientation. However, I conclude that even if 
we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orientation, it does not follow 
that there is a choice involved.
Keywords: Sexual orientation; Choice; Interpretation; Sex/Gender; Conceptual-
ization; Categorization.
1  Introduction
The idea that sexual orientation is not a choice is very common (the “born this 
way” and “not a choice” slogans so fiercely endorsed in popular culture and 
in the mainstream LGB political movement), although this is far from unprob-
lematic (Stein 2011; Behrensen 2014). This work discusses William Wilkerson’s 
recent defense of an alternative, and Esa Díaz-León’s critique of it. Wilkerson 
Saray Ayala, Department of Philosophy, California State University Sacramento, Sacramento, 
CA, USA, e-mail: ayala@csus.edu
 ©2017, Saray Ayala, published by De Gruyter.  
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
Authenticated | ayala@csus.edu author's copy
Download Date | 7/5/17 9:44 PM
2      Saray Ayala
(2009, 2013) argues that sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by 
choice, and Díaz-León (2017) critically assesses his argument, concluding that 
we still lack a good argument for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual 
orientation.
My contribution to this debate has two parts. The first part engages Díaz-
León’s critical response to Wilkerson. According to her, Wilkerson does not 
provide a sound argument in favor of the idea that sexual orientation requires 
interpretation of feelings and desires. In particular, Díaz-León questions the 
claim that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted. 
I have two comments on this. On the one hand, although I agree with Díaz-León 
that a metaphysically independent layer of desires might be there prior to any 
interpretative act, I argue that this layer might not correspond to what we call 
sexual orientation. In order to build my argument, I draw a parallel with the con-
ceptual act theory of emotions (Barrett 2006; Barrett et al. 2015). I argue that this 
independently constituted layer of desires could consist of basic affects that need 
to be conceptualized in a particular way in order to become what we call sexual 
orientation. Thus I conclude that even if interpretation is not necessary to con-
stitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element to constitute what we call sexual 
orientation. On the other hand, although I agree with Díaz-León that interpreta-
tion does not in general entail constitution, I argue that it could be the case that 
the specific way in which we conceptualize the affects relevant to sexual orienta-
tion could be one that imposes sharp category boundaries and, in such a case, at 
least some of those feelings would be affected (in a constitutive sense) by how we 
categorize them.
The second part brings us back to Díaz-León’s conclusion that Wilkerson’s 
argument does not successfully show that sexual orientation involves choice. 
This part engages a premise of Wilkerson’s argument that Díaz-León does not 
address in her critique, which is his claim that interpretation requires choice. I 
argue that even if we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orientation, it 
does not follow that there is choice.
2   Constituting vs. Interpreting
2.1   Wilkerson’s Metaphysical Claim and Díaz-León’s Response
In Wilkerson’s argument for the conclusion that sexual orientation involves 
choice, the first premise states that sexual desire is partially constituted by 
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 interpretation;1 the second premise states that interpretation requires choice. 
From these two premises the conclusion follows that sexual orientation involves 
choice (Wilkerson 2009, p. 100). While my second comment engages the second 
premise, I will for now focus exclusively on the argument for the first premise and 
Díaz-León’s response to it. In particular, I will focus on her response to the meta-
physical argument that Wilkerson puts forward.2
Wilkerson defends the view that our acts of classifying and labeling transform 
what is classified, in this case, our feelings and sexual desires. And they transform 
our feelings and sexual desires in a constitutive sense. That is, the way we conceptu-
alize and classify our desires changes their nature. The fact that the same collection 
of desires or experiences can be classified in different ways seems to work as support 
for Wilkerson’s claim, the reasoning being that the possibility of different (correct) 
classifications shows that the desires/experiences are not finished products. The 
assumption here is that there is only one correct way of classifying something that 
is already constituted independently of the classification. If different classifications 
are possible, this means that what is being classified is undetermined.
But as Díaz-León points out, the fact that desires and experiences can be con-
ceptualized and classified in different and even incompatible ways (let us call 
this synchronic flexibility) “does not entail that those experiences were not fully 
formed prior to our conceptualizing them in this or that way” (Díaz-León 2017, 
p.  10). Also, the fact that over time we might change our interpretation of the 
same sexual desires or experiences (we can call this diachronic flexibility), does 
not imply that they were not fully formed prior to our interpretative act. Díaz-León 
illustrates this response by appealing to visual color experiences. The same series 
of color experiences can be classified in different ways, but this only shows that 
the same token experience instantiates more than one type of phenomenal state. 
For instance, the same token of an experience of blue could instantiate the type 
“blue experience” and “dark blue experience”, and actually many more, like the 
very type “visual experience”, or more specific types like “experience I have in 
the evening” (Díaz-León 2017, p. 9). Depending on several factors (e.g. relevant 
1 When discussing whether choice is involved in sexual orientation, we need to clarify at what 
level, or relative to what, choice is supposed to be present or not. There are at least four questions 
we might investigate: that choice is present at the very level of the constitution of sexual desires 
(this is Wilkerson’s position); or in the conceptualization of sexual desires as related to the sex/
gender of other people; or in the application of the concepts for sexual orientation; or in the 
endorsement of a particular sexual orientation or sexual desire.
2 Wilkerson offers two arguments for his first premise, an epistemological and a metaphysical 
one. Although Díaz-León addresses both of them, here I focus on the latter.
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color contrast), we might conceptualize a given experience as “blue experience” 
and group it together with other blue experiences, or we might conceptualize the 
very same experience as “dark blue experience” instead, opting for a more fine-
grained classification that would distinguish it from experiences conceptualized 
as “light blue experience”. This is not the same, and it does not entail, that by 
classifying an experience as “blue experience” we are constituting it as such, and 
that we would constitute a different experience out of the same stimulus if we 
instead classify it as “dark blue experience”. That is, variation in how we concep-
tualize visual experiences does not affect the nature of those experiences. The 
same applies to our conceptualization of sexual desires and experiences of sexual 
attraction. We can group our sexual attractions in different ways, depending on 
factors like the contrast class we find significant (e.g. attraction towards this par-
ticular woman rather than that particular man, to women rather than men, to this 
type of woman rather than some other type), and this does not have to affect the 
nature of those states.
In Wilkerson’s reasoning we find the assumption that flexibility in the con-
ceptualization of something, diachronic or synchronic, is an indication of its 
metaphysically weak character. I agree with Díaz-León that flexibility in how 
we conceptualize something, in any of those senses, does not entail a lack of 
 completion in its constitution. No conclusion about the metaphysical nature of 
something can be directly drawn from the dynamics of its conceptualization. We 
can draw a parallel here between the conceptualizing act and the thing conceptu-
alized, on the one hand, and an explanation and the explanandum, on the other. 
How we explain something (e.g. what type of explanation -causal, teleological, 
formal, at what level, answering what question) is certainly related to the con-
stitution of the explanandum, but it does not straightforwardly reflect the latter. 
An adequate explanation in a particular context responds to several factors, e.g. 
the goals of the inquiry, and these are in principle independent of the constitu-
tion of the thing that is being explained. This normative principle is also descrip-
tively correct, e.g. people seem to value explanations that match their goals at the 
moment (Vasilyeva et al. 2017); the nature of the explanandum does not deter-
mine one specific sort of explanation. Similarly, we should not expect that sexual 
orientation-relevant states determine one single way of categorizing them. Our 
acts of conceptualization respond to several factors, not only the constitution of 
that which we conceptualize.
Thus according to Díaz-León, Wilkerson does not provide a conclusive argu-
ment that our sexual desires and feelings are partially constituted by our concep-
tualization and classificatory practices. Moreover, Díaz-León sympathizes with 
the idea that “in order to make sense of the way we conceptualize and interpret 
our feelings and desires, we need to postulate a layer of ‘raw’ feelings that are 
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fully determined prior to interpretation” (16). That is, on the one hand  Wilkerson’s 
attempted argument against the existence of a metaphysically independent layer 
of desires and feelings fails, and on the other, it seems reasonable to assume that 
such a raw layer is there in order to understand the dynamics of categorization and 
interpretation of them (e.g. the fact that we sometimes change our interpretation 
over time, that we sometimes move from an incorrect to a correct interpretation). 
There are two points I want to make with regards to the question of whether or not 
sexual desires and feelings relevant for sexual orientation are fully and indepen-
dently constituted prior to our conceptualizing them. I present each at a time.
2.2   A Raw Layer of What?
First, in relation to the existence of a raw layer, I argue that even if we concede 
that there must be such a layer of feelings that is fully determined prior to inter-
pretation, this layer might still need interpretation in order to arrive to what we 
usually understand as sexual orientation. That is, perhaps this raw layer consists 
of very basic affects that need interpretation in order to become part of someone’s 
sexual orientation. In order to argue for this possibility, I draw a parallel with 
the conceptual act theory of emotions proposed by Lisa F. Barrett (Barrett 2006; 
Barrett et al. 2015). According to this theory, physical sensations become emo-
tional episodes only when they are conceptualized and therefore take on a certain 
meaning in a particular situation. “[W]e experience an instance of emotion in 
ourselves, or see it in others, when we conceptualize an ongoing, basic affective 
state via the process of categorization.” (Barrett 2006, p. 21). That is, emotions are 
not biological primitives, but are constructed via a categorization process. Barrett 
(2006) identifies two building blocks of emotions: core affect and the categoriza-
tion act. Core affect can be defined as “a neurophysiological barometer of the 
individual’s relation to an environment at a given point in time” (Barrett 2006, 
p. 31). This state, which responds to very basic clues (e.g. whether a stimulus is 
harmful or not), can be characterized with two parameters: valence (pleasure or 
displeasure) and arousal (activation or deactivation). That is, it feels as good or 
bad, and as more or less activated. By means of conceptualizing the core affect 
(e.g. as sadness, fear, anger, happiness) the individual gets to be in an emotional 
state. Importantly, the conceptualization process is tailored to the specific situ-
ation that the individual is in, and it is constrained by the conceptual repertoire 
available to the individual.
The conceptual act theory of emotion stays in sharp contrast to theories that 
postulate a certain (small) number of emotions as natural kinds, which everyone 
will experience independently of the conceptual knowledge they have relative to 
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emotions. According to this natural kinds story, individuals might differ in how 
accurately they report their emotional states, but they all experience the same 
emotions. In the conceptual act theory, however, not everyone experiences the 
same emotions, for this depends on the conceptual knowledge individuals bring 
to bear when categorizing core affect, which responds to both individual and 
 cultural differences.
If we apply the conceptual act theory of emotion to sexual orientation, we 
could postulate a core affect module consisting of some sort of neurophysiologi-
cal state of the individual in relation to sexual-affective affects. This state would 
also be characterized by valence and arousal, but this time will also have sexual 
responses as characteristics. Stimuli (e.g. individual persons, body parts, body 
movements) would cause changes in this state with different degrees of arousal. 
This conceptual act theory of sexual orientation nicely accounts for variability in 
granularity and richness of sexual-affective experiences. One possible alterna-
tive to this would claim, parallel to the natural kinds theory of emotions Barrett 
criticizes, that there is a small set of sexual orientations that are given biologically 
at some primitive level (as dispositions, perhaps?).3 According to the conceptual 
act theory, however, the possibility of a rich conceptual repertoire brings with it 
the possibility of a wide spectrum of sexual orientations. This reading of sexual 
orientation as a conceptualization act over basic affects that is situated, tailored 
to the context, also accounts for cultural differences in how sexual orientations 
are lived and classified.4
Three important questions arise here. First, to what extent the conceptual-
ization process that is necessary to arrive to a sexual orientation is or remains 
a conscious process. It is reasonable to think that as it happens with the con-
ceptualization of affects that become emotions, this process can be automatized 
and performed unconsciously.5 Second, what are the relevant kinds of concepts 
needed? One possibility is to say that you need to have concepts of sexual ori-
entations themselves. A less demanding option is that what you need to have 
are concepts for sex and/or gender,6 so you can conceptualize your affects as 
3 Alternatives to a conceptual act theory of sexual orientation do not necessarily have to endorse 
that sexual orientation is biologically given.
4 This puts the conceptual act theory in line with social constructivist accounts.
5 There is also room for skillfulness in this process. As it happens with conceptualizing in gen-
eral, conceptualizing sexual-affective states could be a skill that can be trained.
6 Whether you need concepts for gender or for sex, or both, depends on how you understand 
sexual orientation, that is, whether it is based on people’s gender, sex, or on both, which in 
turn depends on how you understand what gender and sex are, and especially on how they are 
related. In any case, concepts for sex and for gender are not necessarily limited to the traditional 
binaries.
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directed towards particular categories of people (e.g. a sexual desire for people 
categorized as women).7
Finally, there is the question about how desires and concepts are connected. 
One option here is to claim that having sexual desire and the concepts for sex and/
or gender is sufficient, and nothing else is needed, assuming that the question of 
how the former connects with the latter is uninteresting. Another option is to say 
that while these might be necessary conditions, they are not sufficient. The con-
cepts of sex and/or gender need to be connected to sexual desires and affects in 
the appropriate way, otherwise the sexual desire might be addressed to something 
irrelevant for sexual orientation. In order for sexual desires to be relevant for sexual 
orientation, the former need to be about the sex and/or gender of someone, at least 
if we want to keep our analysis of sexual orientation closely related to the way we 
ordinarily understand it (as something related to the sex and/or gender of people).8 
I hypothesize that the appropriate connection between sexual desire, or what I 
have been calling affects, and the aforementioned concepts involves a second order 
process about the desire, which we might well call interpretation. In this process, 
the desire is represented as desire for a person qua someone gendered in a par-
ticular way (e.g. woman, man, genderqueer, agender). According to this reading, 
requiring the concepts of sex and/or gender entails the presence of interpretation. 
Therefore, in order for a subject to have sexual desire for someone that counts 
as relevant for that subject’s sexual orientation (that is, sexual desire for people in 
virtue of being gendered in a particular way), the subject needs to, on the one hand, 
possess the concepts of sex and/or gender, and on the other, interpret a particu-
lar collection of affects as related to the sex and/or gender of the person(s).9 This 
is importantly different from Wilkerson’s idea that desires themselves are consti-
tuted by interpretation. What I am defending here is that while desires/affects are 
themselves constituted independently of any interpretation, the selection of some 
of those desires/affects and their conceptualization as related to the sex and/or 
gender of someone is an interpretative process necessary for sexual orientation. 
Like the properties of a country when we make a map of it, affects are there prior 
to our interpretation. But only when we select some of the properties of a country 
(e.g. its province boundaries and city limits, its roads, its geological properties, or 
7 See Vernallis (2013).
8 We could decide, however, that the ordinary notion of sexual orientation should be changed, 
and we should allow sexual orientation to include more than desires towards gendered people, 
e.g. desires towards body parts, or even towards personality traits. See ft. 13 below.
9 Bettcher (2014) would require a third element: the gender of the self who feels the attraction. 
In her account, sexual orientation is determined not only by the gender of the people we feel at-
tracted to, but also by our gendered self. For other accounts of sexual orientation, see Dembroff 
(2016), Díaz-León (forthcoming) and Stein (1999).
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its bike paths) and make them salient for our mapping-purposes, do those proper-
ties become part of a political, geological, road, or bike map. Similarly, it is only 
when we make a selection and interpret some of the affects as directed towards 
the sex and/or gender of someone, that those affects become relevant for sexual 
orientation. Interpretation does not have (neither a causal nor) a constitutive effect 
on the affects, but rather on what we call sexual orientation. The analogy with 
mapmaking reveals that selection is a critical part in the interpretation process. 
As it happens in Jorge Luis Borges’ tale “Del rigor en la ciencia” (Borges 1960), a 
1:1 scale map that contained a representation of every single thing in reality and 
coincided in every detail with it would be of no use, it would not even count as a 
map. Similarly, what counts as sexual orientation according to our ordinary use of 
the term is neither any random selection of sexual affects, nor all the sexual affects 
we feel, but a selection of those that are related to the sex/gender of others.10
The view that I am proposing here is also different from Díaz-León’s. In her 
view, desires and concepts are connected in a different way. She says:
once someone possesses these concepts of sex/gender, and has sexual desires that are 
appropriately connected to those concepts, this is sufficient for the content of those desires 
to amount to sexual attraction for men and/or women, qua men and/or women. It is true that 
one can have these desires only when one possesses those concepts, but this does not entail 
that one can have those desires only when one interprets those very desires as being a desire-
for-men or desire-for-women. That is to say, according to the account of sexual orientation 
that we are assuming here, what determines someone’s sexual orientation is a matter of her 
sexual desires for men and/or women, where the subject needs to conceptualize humans in 
terms of their sex and/or gender. But this does not require the subject to interpret her sexual 
desires themselves as sexual desire for men and/or women. (Díaz-León 2017, p. 18–19)
In her view, what I need in order to have a sexual orientation is a desire for S, 
and independently, conceptualizing S as a woman/man/genderqueer. Therefore, 
I happen to be attracted to S qua a woman/man/genderqueer as a consequence 
of these two separate mental moves, so to speak. What I propose is that in order 
10 The significance of the concepts of sex/gender for sexual orientation invites interesting ques-
tions: what about sexual (or even nonsexual) affects that are not conceptualized as related to the 
sex/gender of people? What about sexual desires that do not correspond to sexual orientation? 
Do we need new concepts (other than “sexual orientation”) for them? Or should we rather revise 
our ordinary concept of sexual orientation? I am sympathetic with the latter option, because 
our concept of sexual orientation, which is focused on gender (or for that matter, on sex), is too 
vague (what does it mean to be attracted to a gender? What kinds of genders are eligible?), and 
pretty unhelpful in fighting sexism and heteronormativity, two vices associated with our obses-
sion with gender. I leave that ameliorative project for future research.
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for desires to be part of (our ordinary notion of) sexual orientation, the desires 
themselves need to be conceptualized in certain ways, having to do with the sex 
and/or gender of people.
To sum up, even if we agree that sexual orientation involves a raw layer of 
desires that is metaphysically autonomous and entirely determined prior to any 
conceptualization exercise, this layer might not coincide with what we identify 
as sexual orientation, but rather with one of its composing elements (i.e. affects). 
Therefore, even if Díaz-León is right in her vindication of this metaphysically 
independent layer, interpretation has not been ruled out yet.
2.3   Imposing Categorical Boundaries
My second point engages the choice of visual experiences as an illustration for 
Díaz-León’s defense of the metaphysical independence of experiences (relative 
to our acts of classifying them). With the appeal to visual experiences, Díaz-León 
makes the general point that the possibility of different ways of categorizing an 
experience does not necessarily entail that the experience is not fully formed 
prior to the categorization act. But she also makes a more specific point about 
one particular dimension of classification, i.e. granularity. According to this 
more specific idea, the possibility of having different options along the granular-
ity dimension in our categorization (i.e. fine-grained “dark blue experience” vs. 
coarse-grained “visual experience”), does not entail that the experience itself is 
affected in its constitution (that is, labeling it as “dark blue experience” does not 
make it a more fine-grained experience than labeling it “visual experience”). And 
this is because granularity in the conceptualization of experiences is independ-
ent of the granularity of the experiences themselves. This specific point about 
conceptualizing experiences in more or less fine-grained ways seems uncontro-
versial. It is the general point about categorization more generally that is our 
main interest here and the one I find controversial in Díaz-León’s reasoning.
If all our categorization practices were along the granularity dimension, 
then Díaz-León’s general conclusion that experiences are not affected by how we 
categorize them seems to follow. There are, however, other dimensions of clas-
sification that do not illustrate this general point in the same clear-cut way, and 
that might jeopardize the conclusion Díaz-León wants to arrive to. In particular, 
there is a dimension of classification that, in my opinion, undermines the con-
clusion that the granularity criterion so neatly conveys. I am referring to how 
sharp we take the boundaries of categorical types to be. Let us call it the category 
boundaries dimension. Now let us take an example and see how conceptualiza-
tion might work along this other dimension. Let us consider a stimulus consisting 
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of a series of consonant-vowel syllables, artificially generated, that gradually 
moves along a continuum with 14 different values. The two endpoints (i.e. values 
1 and 14) are /be/ and /ge/. The interesting question is how we would catego-
rize the in-between sounds (i.e. values 2 to 13) as the series moves from /be/ to 
/ge/. On the category boundaries dimension, there are two main ways we could 
categorize that set of stimuli. First, we could categorize it as a continuum; this 
means that the stimuli values in between the two endpoints (i.e. values 2 to 13) 
will be categorized as slightly different from each other, drawing a categorization 
slope; second, we could instead group stimuli into well-defined category groups 
drawing a very sharp boundary between them (e.g. we could group values 2 to 4 
together into one category, and 4–9 into a different category, and so on). Empiri-
cal research suggests that people opt for the second categorization style when 
presented with the continuum syllable series described above (Liberman et al. 
1957). Instead of perceiving subtle differences as the stimulus values gradually 
change from one end point to the other (from /be/ to /ge/), people tend to perceive 
instances of different discrete categories. That is, perception changes dramati-
cally from hearing the sound as /be/ to hearing it as /de/ (around stimulus value 
4), and then again around values 9 and 10 people rapidly go from hearing /de/ 
to hearing /ge/. This case is an example of what in the psychological literature is 
called categorical perception.
One way to read this result is that our categorization act (i.e. the fact that we 
draw sharp categorical boundaries) does affect the stimuli in a profound way. We 
impose category boundaries on the continuous series, and that makes us hear a 
paradigmatic /be/ up to a certain point, right until the moment the sound dramat-
ically shifts to become a paradigmatic instance of a different category, and so on, 
instead of hearing in-between, ambiguous syllables for the in-between stimulus 
values. If we opted for the first, continuum way of categorizing the syllable series, 
we could confidently say that our auditory experience is entirely determined 
by the sound, for ambiguous stimulus values would be categorized as ambigu-
ous. But imposing sharp category boundaries makes our categorization act part 
of what defines and constitutes the experience. While paradigmatic /be/ and 
/ge/ are not transformed by our categorization act (i.e. the two end points), in-
between cases are clearly affected. Now, what if we categorize sexual desires and 
feelings similarly to how we categorize speech stimuli? The category boundaries 
dimension of classification does not leave things as clear-cut as the granularity 
dimension Díaz-León chooses to illustrate her point, or so I argue. It seems possi-
ble now that how we group stimuli matters a lot for how our experiences of them 
are constituted.
It is an open question which of the above cases is a better illustration of how 
we categorize our sexual desires, either the visual experience example or the 
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/be/ - /ge/ case. If the latter, then it is not clear we can conclude that our categori-
zation practices do not affect the constitution of our sexual desires. If we were to 
categorize sexual orientation-relevant affects in a categorical way, similar to how 
we categorize speech stimuli, we would group slightly different affects into a few 
discrete categories, and would feel only those paradigmatic categorical affects. If 
so, the ambiguous in-between affects for which we perhaps do not have concepts 
for, would be assimilated into one of the categories we already have created.
Independently of this, the main point Díaz-León defends still holds, and that 
is that the possibility of different ways of conceptualizing an experience does not 
by itself entail that the experience is undetermined prior to categorizing it, and 
therefore that a conceptualization act is necessary to finish up its constitution. 
Interpretation does not entail constitution. That being said, I emphasize that it 
could be the case that the specific way in which we conceptualize the feelings 
and affects relevant to sexual orientation could be one that imposes sharp cat-
egory boundaries and, in such a case, ambiguous feelings (although perhaps not 
unambiguous ones) would be transformed by how we categorize them, turning 
them into one or another type of experience depending on where our categoriza-
tion act draws the boundary.
3   Interpretation vs. Choice
My second comment engages Wilkerson’s second premise, which says that inter-
pretation requires choice. The main point I make is that the existence of interpre-
tation does not imply choice; only ideal interpretation requires choice. According 
to Wilkerson, “if interpretation is forced, then it loses its meaning as interpreta-
tion” (Wilkerson 2009, p. 109). That is, in a process of interpretation there must 
be alternatives in order to be a proper interpretation, even if the number of them 
is small. Wilkerson illustrates this idea with the example of a literature scholar 
who interprets the work of some author by choosing amongst possible alternative 
interpretations. There is, however, another possible reading of what interpreta-
tion consists of that sees interpretation as figuring out the meaning or dynamics 
of something, as making sense of it. This other reading might or might not involve 
choosing amongst different alternatives. Let me illustrate this with an example.
Imagine you need to activate a machine you have never encountered before. 
In order to do that, you need to make sense of it, understand what at least some 
of its parts do, figuring out how it works. In this process, you might or might not 
have access to different alternative ways of how the machine works. If you are not 
given an instructions manual, you would probably consider different alternative 
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hypothesis of how the machine works, and test them, until you arrive at some 
successful interpretation. If you are given the instructions manual, however, you 
will probably follow it without considering different alternatives. In both cases 
you are interpreting the machine, in the sense of making sense of it (I assume 
that in following the instructions manual you understand something about how 
the machine works, that is, you do not just merely do what the manual says 
without understanding anything). This reading of interpretation as figuring out 
or making sense does not assume, in contrast to Wilkerson’s reading, that choice 
is necessary in interpretation. And this reading fits nicely with the above consid-
erations about a conceptual act theory of sexual orientation: in applying avail-
able conceptual resources, we figure out what our sexual-affective affects are, we 
make sense of them, without necessarily choosing amongst several alternative 
interpretations.
Wilkerson worries that if choice is not part of the interpretation process, 
then we are risking loosing freedom. I think, however, that we do not need to 
assume choice in interpretation in order to guarantee freedom of some sort. 
First, we do not have to eliminate choice altogether from the process of inter-
preting sexual orientation-relevant affects. Rather, we can limit choice to ideal 
cases, in which the interpretation process includes consideration of different 
alternatives. Still, there will be cases in which interpretation happens without 
choice. Second, even if we say that interpretation involved in sexual orientation 
often lacks choice, this does not mean we are not free in some important sense. 
The main point here is to avoid assuming that freedom requires the existence 
of alternate possibilities. Harry Frankfurt’s famous examples were designed to 
show this (Frankfurt 1969), and more specifically, that the freedom-relevant con-
dition to hold an agent morally responsible does not require that they could have 
done otherwise. In line with this, we could appeal to John M. Fisher’s distinction 
between regulative and guidance control over one’s actions (Fisher 1994) and 
apply it to interpretations of sexual orientation-relevant affects. While regulative 
control does require control over which possibility out of a number of alterna-
tives becomes actual, guidance control does not; and the latter is sufficient for 
freedom. Guidance control requires something different; on the one hand, that 
the agent’s actions issue from their own mechanism, which needs to be respon-
sive to reasons, and on the other, that the agent takes responsibility for that 
mechanism, that it is their own. Fisher’s distinction, like Frankfurt’s examples, 
concern freedom as long as it is a requirement for moral responsibility. Even 
though we are not interested in moral responsibility here, we can still benefit 
from their work to illustrate a possible avenue to keep freedom in the picture 
of sexual orientation even if we eliminate the requirement of having access to 
alternative possibilities. Thus we can apply the distinction between regulative 
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control and guidance control to the interpretation of sexual affects, instead of 
actions more generally. If we agree with the idea that only guidance control is 
required for freedom, we can say that when interpreting sexual orientation-rele-
vant affects, we can have freedom even if we do not have access and control over 
alternative interpretations. We can have guidance control over our interpretation 
instead. This picture allows us to distinguish between cases of interpretation of 
sexual affects that reflect genuine freedom, and those that do not. If in the inter-
pretation of their affects, someone does not own the process of interpretation, 
but is instead clearly forced (by internal and/or external factors) to one specific 
interpretation, then we can say that this person has no freedom in the process 
of creating her sexual orientation. But if the person interprets their affects in a 
way that meets the stipulated definition of guidance control, then we can say 
that freedom was part of the picture, even if the person did not have access to 
or actually considered alternative interpretations. A detailed discussion of the 
conditions for owning a process of interpretation lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. As a first step, we can sketch two ideas. First, in a free (although choice-
less) conceptualization we are in principle capable of changing our conceptu-
alization in case of new affects that are incongruent with the current one, as 
opposed to stretching the current conceptualization to fit whatever new affects 
we might have. This condition corresponds to Fisher’s idea that the free agent’s 
mechanism issuing their actions needs to be responsive to reasons. Second, and 
corresponding to Fisher’s second condition, we are capable of reflecting on the 
matter, and take responsibility for our interpretation.11
One indirect source of support for the idea that we have something like Fish-
er’s guidance control over the interpretation of our sexual orientation-relevant 
affects is the fact that if we were to require instead regulative control in order to 
attribute freedom and choice, that is, if in order to have choice and freedom in the 
picture we were required to have access and control over alternative interpreta-
tions, then we have to say that most heterosexual people are not free and do not 
choose. This would make Wilkerson’s proposal only valid for people with a non-
heterosexual orientation. I speculate that most people do not consider alterna-
tive interpretations of their affects before establishing their sexual orientation as 
heterosexual. This happens because heterosexuality is the default interpretation. 
11 Relevant for this discussion is Maren Behrensen’s work. In a discussion on queer identity (not 
sexual orientation), Behrensen (2014) develops a Kantian metaphysical framework (neither simple 
compatibilism nor simple incompatibilist, but sophisticated compatibilist) where self- governance 
and will over one’s inclinations are possible. In this framework, being queer is a choice.
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Most, if not all of the schemas, norms and conceptual resources available that 
can be used in interpreting affects facilitate a heterosexual interpretation. Het-
erosexual interpretation is the default, and default options have a lot of grip in 
human decision-making.12 If I am right in my speculation and the explanation I 
just gave for it, requiring access to, and/or actual consideration of, alternatives 
would dramatically lower the number of people who could be said to be free in 
the process of negotiating their sexual orientation. Also, it would mean that only 
those who conclude a non-heterosexual orientation were free and had a choice in 
 Wilkerson’s sense. A proposal about whether or not choice is involved in sexual 
orientation should be, however, applicable to any sexual orientation, unless we 
make the additional claim that there are qualitative differences among, e.g. het-
erosexual and non-heterosexual orientations, so that the latter but not the former 
involves choice.13 Thus, Wilkerson’s insistence on interpretation requiring choice 
could jeopardize his own conclusion that there is an element of choice (and with 
it, a hint of freedom) in sexual orientation. If most people for most of the time go 
with the default interpretation of affects and this is read as a process lacking in 
freedom and choice, then Wilkerson would have to choose between abandoning 
his requirement to keep choice and freedom in the picture, or accepting that his 
conclusion that sexual orientation involves choice (and freedom) does not cor-
rectly describe how things actually work.
To sum up, it is possible to hold that interpretation is an important part of 
sexual orientation without necessarily holding that choosing among alternative 
interpretations is required. If, moreover, we were to concede that interpretation 
12 One prominent example of the power of default options is the decision to become an organ 
donor. In countries where you have to opt in to become an organ donor, the number of donors is 
very low; in contrast, in countries were the default is to be an organ donor and the form requires 
you to opt out, the number of donors is significantly much higher (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). 
According to some theories of rationality, much of human reasoning is like this ( Gigerenzer 
et al. 1999); that is, it follows simple heuristics like “If there is a default, do nothing about it.” 
( Gigerenzer 2008). The effect of the default option should make us think what would it be like 
a world were the default interpretation of sexual desires and feelings is not heterosexuality, but 
something different.
13 It is possible to hold that as long as there exists a default option, interpretation can never be 
free. More generally, that the existence of a default makes decision-making deficient from the 
very beginning. This would result in the aforementioned situation in which only people who 
go for a non-default option can be said to properly decide, and in particular, that only non-
heterosexual people are properly and freely interpreting their desires. This possibility adds to 
the reasons why heterosexuality as a default is problematic, and undermines the project of ar-
ticulating a view of sexual orientation that accounts for both heterosexual and non-heterosexual 
orientations.
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is always involved in sexual orientation (e.g. because we endorse something like 
the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation), we can still say that interpreta-
tion does not always imply choice (in the sense of having access to alternatives). 
Only interpretation in ideal cases requires so. Now, we can ask what a case of 
ideal interpretation looks like. As mentioned above, in such a case the agent has 
access to alternatives. One way of spelling out what this access involves is to say 
that in ideal cases, the interpretation of sexual affects is connected to other pos-
sible conceptualizations. This is similar to how Robert Nozick (1981) spells out 
what understanding is, as opposed to explanation. While explanation “locates 
something in actuality, showing its actual connections with other things”, under-
standing “locates it in a network of possibility, showing the connections it would 
have to other nonactual things or processes.” (Nozick 1981, p. 12). If we translate 
this insight into our discussion, what we have is that an ideal interpretation con-
nects the actual conceptualization of sexual affects to possible alternative ways 
we could have conceptualized them.
One extreme way of reading ideal interpretation is to say that this access to 
alternatives necessitates the absence of a default option. That is to say that the 
presence of a default option trumps access to this network of possibility. A less 
extreme reading sees the existence of a default option as a significant moderator 
of what alternatives we consider. This second reading aligns with recent research 
in cognitive psychology about what alternatives we consider when confronted 
with different situations (see e.g. Hitchcock and Knobe 2009; Philips et al. 2015). 
Not only statistical but also moral and social norms affect which alternatives we 
consider to be relevant in particular contexts. Applied to the conceptualization of 
sexual affects, this would mean that the existence of a norm (in this case, hetero-
sexual interpretation) affects which alternatives we will consider.
4   Conclusion
Wilkerson’s argument for the claim that sexual orientation requires interpretation 
and therefore choice, takes issue with how sexual desires themselves are consti-
tuted. He claims that sexual desires require interpretation to be fully constituted, 
and for his defense he relies on the idea that sexual desires (and experiences) can 
be conceptualized and classified in different ways. But as Díaz-León points out, 
(synchronic and diachronic) flexibility in the conceptualization and classifica-
tion of desires and experiences does not entail that those desires and experiences 
are not fully constituted prior to their classification. Here I have explored a dif-
ferent argument for the presence of interpretation, one that does not conclude 
Authenticated | ayala@csus.edu author's copy
Download Date | 7/5/17 9:44 PM
16      Saray Ayala
that there is choice in Wilkerson’s sense. First, something like the conceptual 
act theory of emotions could be true of sexual orientation. According to it, there 
are core affects that are metaphysically independent of our conceptualization 
practices, but there is still a step in between them and sexual orientation. This 
step involves a second-order process about those affects that most likely entails 
concepts for sex and/or gender, so affects are about persons in virtue of being 
sexed/gendered in a particular way. This second order process looks like inter-
pretation. Second, I pointed out the possibility that in the interpretation of affects 
relevant for sexual orientation, we impose category boundaries in a way that not 
only impact those affects causally, but also constitutively. The presence of inter-
pretation, however, does not necessarily take us to the conclusion that choice is 
involved in sexual orientation. I argued that interpretation does not require con-
sidering or even having access to alternatives. If so, we need to explore a different 
avenue to say that choice, as commonly understood in the relevant debates, is 
involved in sexual orientation.
Acknowledgments: Previous versions of this paper were presented at two “Minor-
ities in Philosophy” workshops (University of California, Los Angeles and Stan-
ford University chapters), and at a Philosophy Club meeting at California State 
University, Sacramento. I wish to thank the organizers of those events (Olufemi 
Taiwo, Adam Simon, and Selena Trinies, respectively), and audiences for their 
questions. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers of this journal. 
Finally, special thanks go to Esa Díaz-León, for insightful and fun conversations 
on sexual orientation and many other topics during the last 21 years.
Bibliography
Barrett, Lisa F. (2006): “Solving the Emotion Paradox: Categorization and the Experience of 
Emotion”. In: Personality and Social Psychology Review 10. No. 1, p. 20–46.
Barrett, Lisa F., Christine D. Wilson-Mendenhall and Lawrence W. Barsalou (2015): The Con-
ceptual Act Theory: A Road Map. In: Barrett L. F., and J. A. Russell (Eds.): The psychological 
construction of emotion. New York: Guilford, p. 83–110.
Bettcher, Talia Mae (2014): “When Selves Have Sex: What the Phenomenology of Trans Sexual-
ity Can Teach Us About Sexual Orientation”, In: Journal of Homosexuality 61. No. 5, p. 
605–620.
Borges, Jorge Luis (1960): El Hacedor. Madrid: Alianza.
Dembroff, Robin (2016): “What is Sexual Orientation?”. In: Philosophers’ Imprint 16. No. 3, p. 
1–27.
Díaz-León, Esa (2017): “Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and 
Choice”; In: Journal of Social Ontology. DOI 10.1515/jso-2016-0028.
Authenticated | ayala@csus.edu author's copy
Download Date | 7/5/17 9:44 PM
Sexual Orientation and Choice      17
Díaz-León, Esa (forthcoming): “Sexual Orientations: The Desire View”. In: Maitra, Keya, and 
McWeeny, Jennifer (Eds.): Feminist Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fischer, John Martin (1994): The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell.
Frankfurt, Harry (1969): “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”. In: Journal of Phi-
losophy 66, p. 829–39.
Gigerenzer, Gerd, Peter Todd, and The ABC Research Group (1999): Simple heuristics that make 
us smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gigerenzer, Gerd (2008): “Why Heuristics Work”. In: Perspectives in Psychological Science 3. 
No. 1, p. 20–29.
Hitchcock, Christopher and Joshua Knobe (2009): “Cause and Norm”. In: The Journal of Philoso-
phy 106. No.11, p. 587–612.
Liberman, A. M., K. S. Harris, H. S. Hoffman and B. C. Griffith (1957): “The discrimination of 
speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries”, In: Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology 54, p. 358–368. 
Nozick, Robert (1981): Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Philips, Jonathan, Jamie Luguri and Joshua Knobe, (2015): “Unifying Morality’s Influence on 
Non-Moral Judgements: The Relevance of Alternative Possibilities”. In: Cognition 145, p. 
30–42.
Stein, Edward (1999): The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual 
Orientation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stein, Edward (2011): “Sexual Orientations, Rights, and the Body: Immutability, Essentialism, 
and Nativism”. In: Social Research 78. No. 2, p. 633–658.
Vasilyeva, Nadya Y., Daniel Wilkenfeld and Tania Lombrozo (2017): “Contextual Utility Affects 
the Perceived Quality of Explanations”. In: Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, p. 1–15. 
Doi: 10.3758/s13423-017-1275-y.
Vernallis, Kayley (2013): “Bisexual Marriage”. In: Power, N. Halwani R., and Soble, A. (Eds.): 
The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 6th edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
 Littlefield, p. 215–32.
Wilkerson, William S. (2009): “Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In: Journal 
of Social Philosophy 40. No. 1, p. 97–116.
Wilkerson, William S. (2013): “What is ‘Sexual Orientation’?” In: Power, N. Halwani R., and 
Soble, A. (Eds.): The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 6th edition. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 195–213.
Authenticated | ayala@csus.edu author's copy
Download Date | 7/5/17 9:44 PM
